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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
RICHARD WILLIS JONES, : Case No. 20070403-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2006), in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Robin W. Reese, presiding. Jurisdiction is 
conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). See 
Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment, Commitment). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion when, following Jones' motion 
for a directed verdict, it allowed the State to reopen its case for the purpose of putting on 
evidence to establish that the alleged offense occurred in Salt Lake County. 
Standard of Review: "'A motion to reopen to take additional testimony when a 
case has been submitted to the court, but prior to the entry of judgment, is addressed to 
the sound discretion of the trial court.'" Daday v. R.D. Logging Co., Inc., 2003 UT App 
125,2003 WL 21290516, *1 (quoting Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d 496, 497 (Utah 1976)). 
Preservation: This issue is preserved at R. 129:67-72, where Jones moved for a 
directed verdict following the close of State's case and objected to the trial court's 
decision to allow the State to reopen its case for the purpose of presenting evidence to 
establish that the alleged offense occurred in Salt Lake County. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are determinative of the 
issues on appeal. Their text is provided in full in Addendum B. 
United States Constitution Amendment V - Double Jeopardy; 
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 12 - Double Jeopardy; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-202 (Supp. 2007) - Venue of Actions; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (2003) - Presumption of Innocence. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Jones was charged by Information with one count of unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony. R. 2-3. Under the Utah Code, it is unlawful 
"for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance 
analog or a controlled substance." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2006). 
A jury trial was held on March 6, 2007. R. 129. During its case, the State 
presented the following evidence related to where the alleged offense occurred. First, 
Officer Kenneth Eatchel, the arresting officer, was employed by the West Jordan Police 
Department. R. 129:12-13. Second, the alleged offense occurred at "8564 South Saddler 
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[Drive]." R. 129:14. Third, following Jones' arrest, Officer Eatchel took Jones to the 
Salt Lake County Jail. R. 129:18. The State then rested. R. 129:67. 
After the State rested, Jones moved for a directed verdict. R. 129:67; see 
Addendum C. Jones argued the State failed to present evidence that the alleged offense 
occurred in Salt Lake County. R. 129:68. Specifically, he argued the State presented no 
evidence that the Saddler Drive address was in Salt Lake County. R. 129:68. In 
response, the State asked the trial court to take judicial notice that the alleged offense 
occurred in Salt Lake County because Officer Eatchel testified that "he was a West 
Jordan officer," that he "went to that address and that was where the defendant was," and 
that he "took [Jones] to Salt Lake County Jail." R. 129:69, 70. Jones replied that an 
explanation of "the officer's jurisdiction . . . wasn't part of the evidence," and that "the 
location of the jail [was] really irrelevant as to where Mr. Jones was arrested." R. 129:70. 
The trial court refused to take judicial notice that the alleged offense occurred in 
Salt Lake County because he was "not enough personally familiar with this address to say 
tha t . . . it's in West Jordan which is in Salt Lake County." R. 129:69. Thus, the trial 
court concluded, "there may be some question about. . . whether the venue is appropriate 
here in the third district." R. 129:69. Instead, the trial court said it would allow the State 
to reopen its case because the issue of venue was "not a critical fundamental issue in this 
case." R. 129:71. 
Jones objected because "the State has rested" and venue "was an essential element 
that [the State] needed to prove and they haven't." R. 129:71-72. The trial court 
overruled Jones' objection because, "It sounds like an oversight. I don't see any real 
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prejudice, and I'll permit the State to do it if that's what they want to do." R. 129:72. 
The State agreed that it would reopen its case. R. 129:72. 
When the jury returned, the trial court said, "The State has asked leave to reopen, 
and I'll grant that motion, understanding, of course, the defendant has objected, but I'll 
grant the motion." R. 129:73. The State then recalled Officer Eatchel, who testified that 
he arrested Jones "at 8564 South Saddler Drive in West Jordan, Utah in the County of 
Salt Lake." R. 129:74. Jones did not cross-examine Officer Eatchel. R. 129:74. The 
State then again rested its case. R. 129:74. 
In its instructions to the jury, the trial court instructed the jury that before it could 
convict Jones of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, it had to "find from all of 
the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt" the following elements: 
1. That on or about the 6th day of October, 2006, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the defendant, Richard Willis Jones, 
possessed Methamphetamine; and 
2. That methamphetamine was then and there a controlled 
substance; and 
3. That said the [sic] defendant did so intentionally and 
knowingly. 
R. 72. Following deliberations, the jury found Jones guilty of one count of unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance. R. 129:117. 
On April 30, 2007, the trial court sentenced Jones to one "indeterminate term of 
not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison." R. 98. The trial court then suspended 
the prison term and placed Jones on probation. R. 98-100. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following is a recitation of the facts relevant to the issue on appeal. 
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During presentation of its case, the State presented evidence that Officer Eatchel 
was employed by the West Jordan Police Department. R. 129:12-13. On October 6, 
2005, Officer Eatchel went to a house located at "8564 South Saddler [Drive]" in order to 
arrest Jones on an outstanding warrant. R. 129:13-15. Jones was "cooperative" and 
Officer Eatchel arrested him "without incident." R. 129:15. As part of the search 
incident to arrest, Officer Eatchel asked Jones whether he had "anything that I need to be 
concerned with." R. 129:16. Jones responded that he had methamphetamine in his 
pocket. R. 129:16-17. Officer Eatchel retrieved a "plastic pill bottle" from Jones' 
pocket. R. 129:18. He then transported Jones "to the Salt Lake County Jail." R. 129:18. 
Thereafter, the substance found in the plastic pill bottle tested positive for 
methamphetamine. R. 129:47. 
When the trial court permitted the State to reopen its case, the State presented the 
following additional evidence: Officer Eatchel testified that he arrested Jones "at 8564 
South Saddler Drive in West Jordan, Utah in the County of Salt Lake." R. 129:73-74. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Code requires the State to prove venue by a preponderance of the 
evidence. If the State fails to establish venue by a preponderance of the evidence, the 
decision to reopen a case in order to allow the State to present additional evidence is left 
to the sound discretion of the trial court. A trial court abuses its discretion by acting 
beyond the limits of reasonability. 
In this case, Jones argues the trial court abused its discretion by reopening the 
State's case in order to allow the State to present evidence to establish by a 
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preponderance of the evidence that the alleged offense occurred in Salt Lake County. 
The trial court based its decision on its finding that the State's failure to present evidence 
of venue was an oversight. This finding, if true, may have been an appropriate reason for 
allowing the State to reopen its case. Contrary to the trial court's finding, however, the 
marshaled evidence shows that the State's failure to present direct evidence of venue was 
the result of a conscious decision. Thus, Jones concludes, because the State made a 
conscious decision to rely on circumstantial evidence of venue, rather than presenting 
direct evidence, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow the State to 
reopen its case to present direct evidence of venue. Moreover, Jones argues this Court 
should reverse because, absent the additional evidence presented after the trial court 
improperly allowed the State to reopen its case, there was insufficient evidence to 
establish venue by a preponderance of the evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL 
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN, FOLLOWING 
JONES' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT, IT ALLOWED 
THE STATE TO REOPEN ITS CASE IN ORDER TO PUT ON 
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE REGARDING VENUE 
Regarding venue, the Utah Code says, "Criminal actions shall be tried in the 
county, district, or precinct where the offense is alleged to have been committed." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-202(1) (Supp. 2007). "All objections of improper place of trial are 
waived by a defendant unless made before trial." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-202(2); see also 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-201(5)(b) (Supp. 2007) ("The defendant may challenge 
jurisdiction by filing a motion before trial."). 
Regardless of whether the defendant challenges venue prior to trial, the State must 
present evidence regarding venue at trial. jSee State v. Bailey, 282 P.2d 339, 340-41 
(Utah 1955) (reviewing defendant's claim "that the state failed to prove venue and the 
verdict of the jury [was], therefore, contrary to the evidence"); State v. Mitchell, 278 P.2d 
618, 620 (Utah 1955) (same); but see State v. Miller, 2003 UT App 76, 2003 WL 
21294704, at *1 n.2 (mem. decision) (briefly noting, in a footnote, that it "believe[s] that 
the burden to prove venue vests only if venue is challenged before trial" (citing Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-202(2) (1999))). 
"A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each 
element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In 
absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1) 
(2003). Although "[t]he existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of the 
offense," they must still be proved at trial. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3). Specifically, 
the Utah Code says jurisdiction and venue "shall be established by a preponderance of the 
evidence." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3); see Bailey, 282 P.2d at 340 (holding venue 
may "be established inferentially by circumstantial evidence," but it "must be done by a 
preponderance of the evidence" (emphasis in original)). 
If the State fails to establish venue by a preponderance of the evidence, the 
decision to reopen a case in order to allow the State to present additional evidence is left 
"'to the sound discretion of the trial court.'" Daday v. R.D. Logging Co., Inc., 2003 UT 
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App 125, 2003 WL 21290516, at *1 (mem. decision) (quoting Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d 
496, 497 (Utah 1976)); see, e.g.. State v. Gregorious, 16 P.2d 893, 895 (Utah 1932) 
(holding trial court did not abuse discretion by permitting case to be reopened following 
defendant's motion for directed verdict); Daday, 2003 WL 21290516, at *1 (holding trial 
court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion to "reopen the proceedings in order . 
. . to offer an interrogatory response into evidence" because "circumstances indicate that 
[party] had 'ample opportunity' to introduce the interrogatory into evidence during the 
course of the trial, but chose not to" and reopening proceedings "would have necessitated 
providing [opposing party] with an opportunity to rebut it" (internal citation omitted)). 
In this case, Jones argues the trial court abused its discretion by reopening the 
State's case in order to allow the State to present evidence to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the alleged offense occurred in Salt Lake County. A 
trial court "abuses its discretion by acting beyond the limits of reasonability." State v. 
Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511,1J20, 153 P.3d 804 (citing State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 
239-40 (Utah 1992)). 
The trial court based its decision on its finding that the State's failure to present 
evidence of venue was an oversight. R. 129:72. This finding, if true, may have been an 
appropriate reason for allowing the State to reopen its case. See State v. Lawrence, 234 
P.2d 600, 601 (Utah 1951) (noting that after defendant "moved the court for a directed 
verdict on the ground that there had been no evidence of value of the stolen car," the 
"State's attorney might properly and with little difficulty have moved to reopen and 
supply the missing evidence"); Gregorious, 16 P.2d at 895 (holding trial court did not 
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abuse its discretion when, following defendant's motion for a directed verdict because the 
State failed to present corroborating evidence, it allowed the State to reopen its case in 
order to present corroborating evidence). 
Contrary to the trial court's finding, however, the record shows that the State's 
failure to present direct evidence of venue was the result of a conscious decision, not 
oversight. When reviewing a lower court's findings, this Court will "apply the 'clearly 
erroneous' standard." In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54/f23, 147 P.3d 401. "A court's findings are 
clearly erroneous '"if the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the 
appellate court is convinced that a mistake has been made.'"" In re T.M., 2006 UT App 
435,^14, 147 P.3d 529 (citations omitted). 
The marshaled evidence concerning the trial court's finding is as follows. See 
Bluffdale Mountain Homes, LC v. Bluffdale City, 2007 UT 57,^52, — P.3d — ("[W]hen 
appealing a highly fact dependent issue, the appellant has a duty to marshal the 
evidence." (citation omitted)). 
1. During the presentation of its case, the State presented 
the following evidence regarding venue: 
a. Officer Kenneth Eatchel, the arresting officer, 
was employed by the West Jordan Police 
Department. R. 129:12-13. 
b. The alleged offense occurred at "8564 South 
Saddler [Drive]." R. 129:14. 
c. Following Jones' arrest, Officer Eatchel took 
Jones to the Salt Lake County Jail. R. 129:18. 
2. Following Jones' motion for a directed verdict, the State 
argued the trial court should take judicial notice that the 
alleged offense occurred in Salt Lake County because 
Officer Eatchel said he "was a West Jordan officer," 
provided "the address" where the arrest occurred, and 
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testified that after arresting Jones, he took Jones to the 
Salt Lake County Jail. R. 129:68-70. 
3. The State did not ask to reopen its case in order to 
present additional evidence regarding venue. R. 129:71-
72. Rather, the State accepted the trial court's invitation 
to reopen its case after the trial court declined to take 
judicial notice that the alleged offense occurred in Salt 
Lake County. R. 129:71-72. 
Jones argues this evidence shows the trial court's finding was clearly erroneous. 
The record shows that the State had ample opportunity during the presentation of its case 
to present direct evidence that the alleged offense occurred in Salt Lake County. R. 129. 
It also shows that upon Jones' motion for a direct verdict, the State was cognizant of the 
precise evidence it had presented to the jury and believed this evidence was sufficient to 
carry its burden. R. 129:68-70 (prosecutor listing its evidence related to venue and 
asking trial court to take judicial notice that the Saddler Drive address was in Salt Lake 
County based on this evidence). The logical conclusion from this evidence, Jones argues, 
is that the State consciously decided to rely on the circumstantial evidence presented by 
Officer Eatchel, rather than eliciting direct evidence of venue. 
Thus, Jones concludes, because the State made a conscious decision to rely on 
circumstantial evidence of venue, rather than presenting direct evidence, it was an abuse 
of discretion for the trial court to allow the State to reopen its case to present direct 
evidence of venue when its gamble failed. Instead, the trial court should have required 
the State to suffer the consequences of its chosen trial strategy. See U.S. Const, amend. 
V ("No person shal l . . . be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life 
or limb."); Utah Const, art. I, sec. 12 (guaranteeing right of accused person not to "be 
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twice put in jeopardy for the same offense55); Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982) 
(holding Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of allowing the 
prosecution to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding); State v. 
Jackson, 857 P.2d 267, 269 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (noting that it would be a "direct 
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution55 to allow "the State 'two bites at the apple,555 by "permitting the State to 
present its case, and if it loses, to present a stronger case55 (citation omitted)). 
Moreover, Jones argues this Court should reverse because, absent the additional 
evidence presented after the trial court improperly allowed the State to reopen its case, 
there was insufficient evidence to establish venue by a preponderance of the evidence. 
See Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511 at [^20 (holding a trial court's error requires reversal "if 
absent the error 'there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
defendant.555 (citation omitted)). 
In Bailey, the defendant "contended] that the state failed to prove venue and the 
verdict of the jury [was], therefore, contrary to the evidence.55 Bailey, 282 P.2d at 340. 
On appeal, our supreme court held venue had been "sufficiently established55 because 
"[t]he trial court would take judicial notice that Panguitch is in Garfield County, and of 
its location within the county,55 the testimony offered by both defense and state witnesses 
"adequately established that the offense was committed at a point about one mile east of 
Panguitch,55 and "[t]he testimony of defendant himself, as to his direction and line of 
travel, leads to the same inference.55 Id. at 340-41. "From such testimony it may 
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reasonably be inferred that the offense was committed in Garfield County, judicial notice 
having been taken of the location of Panguitch within said county." Id. at 341. 
Similarly, in InreJ.G., 2002 UT App 432, 2002 WL 31875656 (mem. decision), 
this Court held that the State established the venue of Davis County by a preponderance 
of the evidence where the evidence showed the "theft was reported to, and investigated 
by, the Woods Cross Police Department," the informant "resided within Davis County," 
and defendant's "custodial parent resided in Davis County." J.G., 2002 WL 31875656, at 
* 1; see also Mitchell 278 P.2d at 620 (holding State established venue by preponderance 
of the evidence where evidence strongly suggested body, which was found in Cache 
County, had not "been transported any considerable distance," and "defendant by his own 
testimony, placed himself in Cache County when he stated he returned to Idaho via 
freight train, which, at the time of this homicide, we may take notice, necessarily would 
have to have traversed that county"). 
Conversely, in this case, the State presented insufficient evidence to prove venue 
by a preponderance of the evidence. As explained above, the marshaled evidence 
presented by the State regarding venue was limited to the following: 
1. Officer Kenneth Eatchel, the arresting officer, was employed 
by the West Jordan Police Department. R. 129:12-13. 
2. The alleged offense occurred at "8564 South Saddler 
[Drive]." R. 129:14. 
3. Following Jones' arrest, Officer Eatchel took Jones to the 
Salt Lake County Jail. R. 129:18. 
This evidence was insufficient to allow the trial court to take judicial notice of venue. R. 
129:69. Likewise, Jones argues, it was insufficient to establish by a preponderance of the 
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evidence that the alleged offense occurred in Salt Lake County. As recognized by the 
trial court, the Saddler Drive address is not readily recognizable as a Salt Lake County 
address. R. 129:69. Moreover, there was no evidence presented to the jury explaining 
the boundaries of Officer EatchePs jurisdiction or why Officer Eatchel took Jones to the 
Salt Lake County Jail for booking. R. 129. Accordingly, Jones argues, the evidence 
regarding Officer EatchePs employment at the West Jordan Police Department and his 
decision to transport Jones to the Salt Lake County Jail does not establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the offense occurred in Salt Lake County. 
In sum, absent the evidence presented after it reopened its case, the State's 
evidence was insufficient to establish venue by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, 
because the trial court's decision to allow the State to reopen its case was an abuse of 
discretion, this Court should reverse because the State presented insufficient evidence to 
prove venue by a preponderance of the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Jones respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction for one count of 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance. 
SUBMITTED this ]^_ day of October, 2007. 
[J?SEPPI ^Pf 
1&-L, 
LORI 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, LORI J. SEPPI, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered the 
original and seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 
5th Floor, P.O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the 
Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, 
P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this 2^_ day of October, 2007. 
o-pfH^ Q - ^ J p - t m LORI rSEPPI 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's 
Office as indicated above this day of October, 2007. 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD WILLIS JONES, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 051907381 FS 
Judge: ROBIN W. REESE 
Date: April 30, 2007 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marlened 
Prosecutor: COLLINS, CHOU CHOU 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GARLAND, ANDREA J 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 26, 1963 
Video 
Tape Number: TAPE Tape Count: 11:29 
CHARGES 
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/06/2007 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Page 1 
Case No: 051907381 
Date: Apr 30, 2007 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $10750.00 
Suspended: $9250 . 00 
Surcharge: $7 02 . 70 
Due: $1500.00 
Total Fine 
Total Suspended 
Total Surcharge 
Total Principal Due 
$10750.00 
$9250.00 
$702 .70 
$1500.00 
Plus Interest 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $300.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: (LEGAL DEFENDERS) ATTORNEY FEES 
The amount of Attorney Fees is to be determined by Adult Probation 
& Parole. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 year(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1500.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
Violate no laws. 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or 
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
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Parole. 
PAY $1,500.00 FINE 
PAY $300.00 ATTORNEY FEES 
MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH AP&P 
MAINTAIN STABLE RESIDENCE 
COMPLETE SUBSTANCE ABUSE EVALUATION, 
COMPLETE COGNITIVE RESTRUCTURING 
FOLLOW ALL PROBATION PROGRAMS 
Dated this day of /Q^Z^J? 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I 
Sec- 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-202 (Supp. 2007) 
76-1-202. Venue of actions. 
(1) Criminal actions shall be tried in the county, district, or precinct where 
the offense is alleged to have been committed. In determining the proper place 
of trial, the following provisions shall apply: 
(a) If the commission of an offense commenced outside the state is 
consummated within this state, the offender shall be tried in the county 
where the offense is consummated. 
(b) When conduct constituting elements of an offense or results that 
constitute elements, whether the conduct or result constituting elements 
is in itself unlawful, shall occur in two or more counties, tr ial of the offense 
may be held in any of the counties concerned. 
(c) If a person committing an offense upon the person of another is 
located in one county and his victim is located in another county at the 
time of the commission of the offense, trial may be held in either county. 
(d) If a cause of death is inflicted in one county and death ensues in 
another county, the offender may be tried in either county. 
(e) A person who commits an inchoate offense may be tried in any 
county in which any act that is an element of the offense, including the 
agreement in conspiracy, is committed. 
(f) Where a person in one county solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or 
attempts to aid another in the planning or commission of an offense in 
another county, he may be tried for the offense in either county. 
(g) When an offense is committed within this state and it cannot be 
readily determined in which county or district the offense occurred, the 
following provisions shall be applicable: 
(i) When an offense is committed upon any railroad car, vehicle, 
watercraft, or aircraft passing within this state, the offender may be 
tried in any county through which such railroad car, vehicle, water-
craft, or aircraft has passed. 
(ii) When an offense is committed on any body of water bordering 
on or within this state, the offender may be tried in any county 
adjacent to such body of water. The words "body of water" shall 
include but not be limited to any stream, river, lake, or reservoir, 
whether natural or man-made. 
(iii) A person who commits theft may be tried in any county in 
which he exerts control over the property affected. 
(iv) If an offense is committed on or near the boundary of two or 
more counties, trial of the offense may be held in any of such counties. 
(v) For any other offense, trial may be held in the county in which 
the defendant resides, or, if he has no fixed residence, in the county in 
which he is apprehended or to which he is extradited, 
(h) A person who commits an offense based on Chapter 6, Par t 11, 
Identity Fraud Act, may be tried in the county: 
(i) where the victim's personal identifying information was ob-
tained; 
(ii) where the defendant used or attempted to use the personally 
identifying information; 
(iii) where the victim of the identity fraud resides or is found; or 
(iv) if multiple offenses of identity fraud occur in multiple jurisdic-
tions, in any county where the victim's identity was used or obtained, 
or where the victim resides or is found. 
(2) All objections of improper place of trial are waived by a defendant unless 
made before trial. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (2003) 
76-1-501. Presumption of innocence — "Element of the 
offense" defined. 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until 
each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct pro-
scribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of the offense 
but shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence. 
History: C. 1953, 76-1-501, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-501. 
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1 THE COURT: You're free to leave, sir. 
2 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
3 THE COURT: If the report has been received, and I think 
4 it has, just leave it there. Yeah, right there. Go ahead. 
5 THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Any additional witnesses, 
7 Counsel? 
8 MS. SKINNER: No, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: All right. The State has rested. 
10 Counsel, are you going to present evidence today? 
11 MS. GARLAND: I anticipate doing so, but before I do 
12 that, your Honor, I have a motion to make outside the presence of 
13 the jury. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. We'll take just a very short recess. 
15 We'll ask you to remember the rules that I have explained twice 
16 already. Deputy, would you conduct them -- excuse me -- outside 
17 the jury room? 
18 (Jury excused) 
19 THE COURT: All right. For the record, the jury has 
20 left. Go ahead, Counsel. 
21 MS. GARLAND: Thank you, your Honor, and this is for the 
22 benefit of the record. I am requesting a directed verdict of not 
23 guilty based on a lack of evidence of possession of a controlled 
24 substance. The testimony today was that the scientific method 
25 would require further testing. We've heard that further testing 
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1 was available and further testing was not done, and for those 
2 reasons I don't believe that the State has established that 
3 element that this was a controlled substance that we are involved 
4 with here today. I don't believe anybody testified whether or 
5 not we were in Salt Lake County when Mr. Jones was arrested as 
6 well. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, do you want to respond to 
8 that? 
9 MS. SKINNER: Yes. Your Honor, first of all, the 
10 officer testified as to the address. He did not specifically say 
11 Salt Lake County, but it is a Salt Lake County address, and he 
12 did testify as to the address at which he arrested Mr. Jones at, 
13 the Saddler Way address. 
14 In addition, Mr. Bechaver clearly testified that he 
15 performed the standards test, that based upon his training and 
16 his experience and what is required as the lab requirements, this 
17 is methamphetamine. It's a scientifically recognized test. It's 
18 the test that we use every day in Court. 
19 He's not required to perform any additional tests, and 
20 he didn't in accordance to the requirements that he was given. 
21 THE COURT: Go ahead, Counsel. 
22 MS. GARLAND: Your Honor, there's no evidence that this 
23 was a Salt Lake address. There's evidence that it was an 
24 address, not that it was in Salt Lake County. 
25 THE COURT: I guess I'll have to check that. Did the 
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1 officer testify that it was in West Jordan, do you recall9 I 
2 don't want him to --
3 MS. GARLAND: That I don't recollect. 
4 MS. SKINNER: He did not specifically say that it was in 
5 West Jordan. He said that he was a West Jordan officer, and that 
6 he was given this address and that he -- he then went to that 
7 address and that was where the defendant was. I'd ask the Court 
8 to take judicial notice that that address is actually in Salt 
9 Lake County. 
10 THE COURT: I don't think I would have any trouble 
11 taking judicial notice that West Jordan City is in Salt Lake 
12 Count, but I'm not enough personally familiar with this address 
13 to say that I could take judicial notice that it's in West Jordan 
14 City which is in Salt Lake County, so if that's — if you both 
15 concur and that that was the limit of the testimony, then there 
16 may be some question about whether this Court has -- or whether 
17 this is properly before the Court, whether the venue is 
18 appropriate here in the third district. 
19 So if you're both right and there was no testimony that 
20 this was West Jordan City, I don't know that I can personally say 
21 in other words that -- or take judicial notice that 8564 South 
22 Saddler Drive is in fact in Salt Lake County as opposed to Utah 
23 County or Davis County or Tooele County or some other county. So 
24 if -- what would you suggest, then, Counsel, if you agree that 
25 you have not presented that evidence9 
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1 MS. SKINNER: Again, your Honor, it's — the officer 
2 clearly stated he's a West Jordan officer. That is his 
3 jurisdiction. It was one of his officers that gave him that 
4 address. He stated that that's where he went and arrested him 
5 and took him to Salt Lake County Jail. So I don't know that I 
6 can ask anything other than that we take judicial notice that 
7 it's -- that it is actually in Salt Lake County. The officer 
8 doesn't have jurisdiction outside of Salt Lake County. 
9 THE COURT: Well, Counsel, do you have anything else to 
10 say9 And for both of your points, too, so that we're not just 
11 focused on one. You made two points in your motion to dismiss, 
12 so either one of them if you have anything further to say. One 
13 was the scientific method and the other one was --
14 MS. GARLAND: Yes. Just simply going to the issue of 
15 the officer's jurisdiction, that wasn't part of the evidence. 
16 Secondly, the location of the jail is really irrelevant as to 
17 where Mr. Jones was arrested. 
18 THE COURT: But you don't want to comment further on the 
19 scientific principle — scientific method? 
20 MS. GARLAND: I believe I've made my — 
21 THE COURT: You've covered that? 
22 MS. GARLAND: I believe I've covered that. Thank you. 
23 THE COURT: I'll deny the motion to dismiss on that 
24 ground. It seems to me that the witness who testified said that 
25 there were three tests that he's trained and required to perform 
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1 as a part of the certification -- the two color tests, which are 
2 presumptive tests, that he performed those. They both indicated 
3 methamphetamine. He followed up then with the gas 
4 chromatograph/mass spectrometer and that confirmed the result. 
5 He testified there was no need to check it against a standard 
6 like heart medicine, which you had asked, because he had the --
7 he had confirmation it was methamphetamine. 
8 I suppose you could argue that it may have closely fit 
9 the profile of heart medicine or something else, but in my 
10 judgment, at least, he's provided sufficient testimony from which 
11 the jury, if they chose to believe it, could find that the 
12 defendant was guilty. 
13 On the second point, my memory -- I don't remember 
14 whether the officer talked about this being in West Jordan City 
15 or not, but both of you agree that he hasn't. I would be willing 
16 because it sounds like an oversight to permit the State to reopen 
17 to call the officer for that one purpose --
18 MS. SKINNER: Thank you. 
19 THE COURT: — and allow him to testify. I don't want 
20 to be seen as helping either side, but that's not a critical 
21 fundamental issue in this case. It's something that has to be 
22 resolved, but I'd be willing to let the State do it. Then 
23 Counsel, if you want to cross examine him further, you certainly 
24 I could. 
25 | MS. GARLAND: Your Honor, I would object simply because 
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1 the State has rested. 
2 THE COURT: I know. 
3 MS. GARLAND: And that was an essential element that 
4 they needed to prove and they haven't. 
5 THE COURT: They have rested. It sounds like an 
6 oversight. I don't see any real prejudice, and I'll permit the 
7 State to do it if that's what they want to do. 
8 MS. SKINNER: Thank you, your Honor. I would like to do 
9 that, if I may. 
10 THE COURT- Okay. We'll — if you're both ready, other 
11 than that -- I'll deny the motion, Counsel. If you're both ready 
12 other than that we'll bring back the jury and resume the trial, 
13 unless there's something else. 
14 MS. GARLAND: No. 
15 THE COURT: Either of you. Okay. 
16 And then, Ms. Garland, you'll be calling the defendant 
17 as a witness9 
18 MS. GARLAND: Yes, thank you. We anticipate doing that. 
19 THE COURT: All right. While they're still coming, 
20 you've both been given a copy of the suggested instructions, so 
21 maybe after we've finished with Mr. Jones we can have you take a 
22 quick look at it, see if you have any exceptions. We'll take 
23 your exceptions on the record, and then instruct the jury and 
24 argue. In any event, you both have a copy, I believe. 
25 COURT BAILIFF: Please rise. 
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1 (Jury returned to courtroom) 
2 COURT BAILIFF: Please be seated. 
3 THE COURT. All right. For the record, the jury is 
4 back, and Counsel, if you'd like to call your witness, please. 
5 MS. GARLAND: Thank you, your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: I'm sorry, I'm sorry. The State has asked 
7 leave to reopen, and I'll grant that motion, understanding, of 
8 course, the defendant has objected, but I'll grant the motion. 
9 Counsel, did you have another witness? 
10 MS. SKINNER: Yes, your Honor, if we may just briefly 
11 recall Detective Eatchel. 
12 THE COURT: Officer, if you'll come back, take your 
13 seat, and just remember, please, that you're still under oath. 
14 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
15 BY MS. SKINNER: 
16 Q. Detective Eatchel, you previously testified that on 
17 October 6th of 2005 you arrested Mr. Jones, the defendant, at 8564 
18 South Saddler Drive — 
19 MS. GARLAND: I'm going to object to the form of the 
20 question, Judge. This is a leading question. 
21 THE COURT: Why don't you rephrase the question, 
22 Counsel. I'll sustain that. 
23 Q. BY MS. SKINNER: Okay. Maybe I can just ask, when 
2 4 you -- according to your previous testimony when you arrested 
2 5 Mr. Jones, where were you when you arrested him9 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
-74-
A. It was at 8564 South Saddler Drive in West Jordan, Utah 
in the County of Salt Lake. 
Q. Okay. And that is within your jurisdiction? 
A. Yes. 
MS. SKINNER: Okay. Thank you. I have no further 
questions. 
THE COURT: Any cross examination on that point, 
Counsel'7 
MS. GARLAND: No. Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You can take your seat, Officer. 
Does the City -- or excuse me, does the government rest 
at this point? 
MS. SKINNER: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now I'm sorry, we kind of put the 
cart ahead of the horse. Now Counsel, are you ready to call 
Mr. Jones? 
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